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The Possibilities and Limits of Public Life: Habermas and the Mass Media
The present interest of political theorists and activists in the problems of public sphere dates back to
the late 1980s when reflections on civil society began to enjoy renewed currency. One of the main
reasons for the re-emergence of civil society as a key issue was that it seemed to provide the
theorists and activists alike with a means by which to justify and reinvigorate political participation
not only in Western mass democracies with their falling turnout at polls, but also in East-European
socialist countries with their dissident movements fighting the one-party system. It became soon,
however, clear that civil society, a concept generated by Enlightenment social philosophers in order
to tackle with the phenomenon of the rising bourgeois society in the late 17th to early 19th
centuries,  was  too  contradictory  and  ambiguous  a  notion,  at  least  without  further  specification,  to
serve  as  the  axis  of  social  and  political  theory  (cf.  Taylor  1990  and  Honneth  1992).  In  any  case,
when the civil society and the public sphere were seen as the dual basis of a politically active
society, it was natural that the work of Jürgen Habermas was brought into focus. His early treatise
on public sphere, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, originally published in 1962, was translated
eventually into English in 19891, and Habermas himself took up the concepts of public sphere and
civil society, not part of his theoretical apparatus during the intervening years, for renewed
inspection. Coupled with the different traditions in theorising civil society, the differences between
’young’ and ’mature’ Habermas in conceptualising public sphere have escaped the attention of
many who have  either  drawn on  or  criticised  his  idea  of  how the  public  sphere  has  functioned,  is
functioning and should function in a democratic society. The debates around Habermas’ relevance
to understanding public communication and mass media have also been complicated by the fact that
the philosophical and sociological interpretations, constituting the overwhelming majority of
commentaries on his work, have usually bypassed his concern with mass communication. As a
consequence, this justifies a dual strategy in evaluating Habermas’ contribution to the defence of
public life in the contemporary world. By linking in the following, on one hand, the work of
1 The Danish and Norwegian translations, eg, preceded the English one by some 15 years.
2’young’ and ’mature’ Habermas, on the other, and his (mass) communication theory and social
philosophy, I will try to adopt this dual strategy.
The Frankfurt Schoold, Delopment of Habermas’ Thought and Public Life
Habermas launched his career as a Western Marxist of the Frankfurt School type, which has had a
lasting effect on the manner he conducts social research. For this reason, I will start from the fact
that Strukturwandel, his first major work and most substantial contribution to the theory of public
sphere,  was  conceived  in  the  midst  of  his  attempts  at  developing  Marxist  social  theory  and
philosophy. In order to understand Habermas’ theoretical solutions concerned with public life one
has,  then,  to  situate  them within  this  wider  project.  ’Western  Marxism’  is  a  catchword  grouping
different philosophers, sociologists and literary critics who, after World War I, opposed the
economist and natural-scientific interpretation of Marxism (Anderson 1976 is a standard work on
the subject). In addition to Antonio Gramsci in Italy and Jean-Paul Sartre in France, Adorno,
Horkheimer and Marcuse of the Frankfurt School were its best-known representatives. To spell
out basic motives in Habermas’ œuvre,  I  distinguish  between  three  avenues  or  dimensions  of
analysis that characterised both the way those associated with the original Frankfurt School were
revising Marxism and how Habermas formed his own project on their basis.
First, as the great upheavals of post-World-War-I decades made clear, there was more
to social development than mere economic determinism. The rise of fascism in Germany, the turn
to Stalinism in the Soviet Union, and the growth of large corporations, cultural industry included,
in the United States necessitated a revision in Marxist vocabulary. The case of fascism
demonstrated that working-class lacked class-consciousness; that of Stalinism, that changing the
economic basis was not enough for transforming the whole society; and that of culture industry,
that capitalism could intervene effectively into areas which previously had remained outside of
commodity-relations. What was needed, then, was a theory that could explain both the waning of
revolutionary spirit, the dead-end of the communist alternative to capitalism, and the
transformation of the cultural super-structure – or, the major political, economic and ideological
trends in early 20th developments in Europe and North-America.
Second, the grounds for social critique had to be altered if the new – critical – theory
was to be consistent. If the working-class was not the emancipatory force old Marxists had
believed it to be, the yardsticks by which to measure emancipation had to be changed. There was
no self-evident avant-guarde or infallible leader in society which would guarantee that the course
taken was progressive. Instead, the normative grounding of critique had to resort to other
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structure. This made a return to Kant and Hegel, but also – in a more pessimist vein – to Nietzsche
and Weber, attractive. So, in order to substantiate the diagnoses of 20th century social and cultural
developments made by the members of the Frankfurt School, they had to rethink and rework the
tension between Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment values.
Third, the ’Great Transformation’ (Polanyi 1957) of the turn of the 20th century made
it explicit that the bourgois society had a history, or that it developed through phases. The liberal
phase of the 19th century was followed by a post-liberal which, with Auschwitz and Hiroshima,
seemed to turn the wheels backwards. The first and second aspects – that is, the theory of post-
liberal society and the normative grounds for its critique – had to be incorporated into a wider
perspective provided by a philosophy or theory of history, if the critique wanted to help
contemporaries to decide on what to do in the present, as the Frankfurt School had assumed to be
the  role  of  social  theory.  Here,  it  was  the  level  from  which  history  was  witnessed  as  well  as
whether the view on history turned out to be optimistic or pessimistic that divided opinions.
I take these three problematics essential to the first-generation of the Frankfurt School
– the transformation of the bourgeois society, the value of the Enlightenment tradition, and the
need for a philosophy of history – as the starting point for my exposition of Strukturwandel.
The critical theorists before Habermas had based their diagnosis of the era of ’Hitler’,
Stalin and Disney’ (Bathrick 1984) on the premise that liberal capitalism was over, and that a new
illiberal type of society had taken its place. What Habermas attempted to accomplish in
Strukturwandel was to provide the Frankfurt  School with a well-defined theory of the bourgeois
society that could spot the logic of the deformations the bourgeois ideals had to undergo in order
to lead to the disasters of the 20th century. To do his Habermas turned to old Hegel. It is the social
theory of Philosophy of Right –  with  its  tripartite  division  of  society  into  state,  civil  society  and
family – that informs Habermas’ conception in Strukturwandel. Also Marx had made the same
move, but he had flattened the division into the dualism of the economic base (civil society) and
the super-structure (state and family). Because the later transformations of the bourgeois society,
as  we  have  seen,  had  made  it  obvious  that  there  was  something  wrong  with  this  kind  of
economism, Habermas not only abandoned the Marxist dualism but also introduced a new
category into the Hegelian model: the public sphere. What was new in the bourgeois society
inhered in the principles governing the public sphere, and what had gone wrong in its development
into the 20th century could be diagnosed on the decline of public life. This is then the historical
story Habermas tells in Strukturwandel – the rise, heyday and waning of a great promise.
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counterfactual belief in the continuing relevance of public life. This is where the ideals of
Enlightenment come into the picture. For Habermas, the bourgeoisie had made a world-historical
innovation in developing, by the means of public discussion and debating, a counterforce to
absolutism on the basis of which it could organise itself politically. The actuality of the public
sphere  or  –  in  Kant’s  words  –  ’the  public  use  of  reason’  is,  in Strukturwandel and afterwards,
important for Habermas because it is both a non-violent way of pacifying society and a method by
which rational consensus can be achieved. In this Enlightenment sense, the public sphere
functions normatively both as a means of social integration and legitimation. To derail public life
is, then, to lead the society into a state of crisis. Against this measure, the 20th century society –
Habermas’ immediate objet is post-war West-Germany – with its public sphere turned into public
relations kicks and cheap thrills is judged wanting.
To make the Enlightenment topos convinging, one could argue either historically or
logically. In Strukturwandel,  Habermas  pursues  neither  strategy  –  that  is,  he  does  not  present  a
grounding of the public-sphere thesis either by following the unravelling of (public) reason in
history or by formulating a theory of rationality. Habermas did make substantial contributions in
both  directions  after  the  early  1960s.  In Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus (1973), he
offered a kind of philosophy of history based on the develpment of communicative reason, and in
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (1981), his opus magnum, he reformulated the function of
philosophy and critical theory as the theory of rationality. The latter direction was to remain his
main avenue of approaching communication and – mutatis mutandis – public sphere. This lack of
either historical or logical justification for the theoretical solutions applied is one reason why one
cannot formulate Habermas’ theory of public sphere on the basis of Strukturwandel only.  The
other is the method adopted here but never to be returned to: historical sociology. Strukturwandel
is deeply indebted to a sociological reading of historical research on 17th to 19th centuries
political, social and cultural life. This is as close as Habermas ever gets to the empirical pulse of
social world.
Between the turn of the 1960s and the late 1970s, Habermas changed his basic
philosophy,  if  not  his  problematic  –  as  had  done  before  him  Hegel  or  Marx.  So  there  is  some
justification to be found for the separation between ’young’ and ’mature’ Habermas. Taking
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (1981) and Faktizität und Geltung (1992) as the two main
articulations of mature Habermas, I will next move to the way Habermas makes self-criticism of
the public-sphere model presented in Strukturwandel. To make the changes explicit, I will a take
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general basis of rationally motivated norms and values.
In Theorie, Habermas replaces the Marxist conception of bourgeois society by that of
modern society. The change of vocabulary is motivated by that of conceptual order, in two
important senses. Namely, the Hegelian categories are substituted for a mix of systems theory
(’system’) and phenomenology (’life-world’), and, which is crucial in our context, public sphere,
in an uspecified manner, is incorporated as an independent category in life-world. The difference
between system and life-world is based on the possibility of institutionalisation: what belongs to
the system (the political and economic systems) can be institutionalised, whereas life-world (cf.
family and public sphere in the earlier categorisation) cannot. As a consequence, the quadruple
conceptualisation by which Strukturwandel kept its distance to orthodox Marxism is replaced by a
dichotomy that retains a distant echo of Marxist verticalism: the life-world functions as the basis
of the system, and, in an ideal sense, the former should determine the limits of the latter. What is
more, this new bottom-up vision of modern society, which methodologically combines systems
theory with action theory, provides Habermas with the opportunity to rephrase, in a new
conceptual order, the relation between Enlightenment values and public life.
According to Habermas the modern society irretrievably differentiated into
institutionalised and uninstitutionalised sub-systems – ie, economy and polity, on one hand, and
life-world with its constituents, on the other. Differentiation means that one sub-system cannot
dictate the logic of another, only control that the other keeps the functioning of its logic within
proper limits. For instance, the capitalist logic of the economic system should not be hampered,
but it must be regulated in the sense that capitalist commodity-production must respond to the
authentic needs of people. The controlling of economy does not, then, occur by way of the
workers’ control of the production (industrial democracy), but by way of political system (political
democracy) which passes laws redirecting the behaviour of firms. As a result of the altered focus,
the central issue of Enlightenment political philosophy, the idea of popular sovereignty, becomes
crucial in Habermas’ political theory of modernity. But how can the people have the ultimate
power, when society is divided into spheres – mainly, economy and administration, but (we will
come to this in some detail later) also privately owned mass media – in which only those involved
can have a word to say?
Habermas’ theory of communicative action, the development of which takes in
Theorie some 1000 pages, provides the answer. As I will concentrate on Habermasian ideas of
communication separately in the following section, I will only indicate the main lines of the
argument here.
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as  a  unity  of  disjoined  parts  (Entzweiung) which was taken up by Marx in his dual model of
society.  The  political  problem  with  which  both  Hegel  and  Marx  had  to  come  to  terms  was
concerned with the way the separated social parts could be recoupled and brought under control.
In Hegel this called for the ’top-down’ idea of the strong state whereas Marx reversed the model
with his ’bottom-up’ vision of the living labour as the ultimate site of power. Habermas accepts
the general problem but not the solutions proposed by either Hegel or Marx. In an explicit sense,
what Habermas strives for is updating some central theses of Western Marxism drawing on Neo-
Kantianism (Weber) and Neo-Hegelianism (Lukács), especially the idea of the modern society
governed by instrumental reason, processes of abstractification and everyday alienation. To
accomplish this, Habermas both accepts Hegel’s basic premise of the new level of rationality
achieved by the bourgeois society and claims that today one can pursue this line of reasoning only
by resorting to the theoretical means of systems theory and hermeneutics. It is with these
conceptual instruments that he reformulates the political problem of popular sovereignty.
Because the modern society is divided into two halves, those of the system (state
administration and economy) and life-world (public sphere, everyday life), it is only through
popular sovereignty or democracy that it can achieve legitimate unity. This democracy can be, at
the same time, only partial or indirect and dependent on specific structural requirements. Modern
constitutional democracies are only partially or indirectly democratic, because there lies an
unbridgeable political gulf in the way the life-world can influence state and business behaviour. In
other words, people can elect and re-elect politicians, but they have no means at hand to replace
state or corporate officials. Moreover, this is to the best interest of all because, considering the
complexity  modern  societies  have  achieved,  it  is  only  on  the  basis  of  division  of  labour  and
competencies that the wheels can be kept rolling. But the people must have the last word in the
sense that the system responds to the needs of the life-world. This gives to public life and mass
media a central place in the conceptual edifice. Namely, it is only through public articulation that
the members of the society can bring to light their wishes and inform themselves about the wishes
of others. Or, the society as a whole as well as its individual members can realise themselves only
by addressing and encountering each others in public. To see the implications of this social theory
for media and communication theory, I will get a closer look at the foundations of Habermas’
theory of public sphere and communicative action.
  Communication as the Link between Private and Public Life
7  In Strukturwandel Habermas demonstrated his originality within the Frankfurt School by
initiating what was later to be called the ’communicative turn’ – that is, by addressing the basic
problems of the Frankfurt School with the help of a communicative point of view. In order to weigh
the magnitude of this change of perspectives one has to keep in mind that communication, meaning
everyday communication in speaking and writing, was generally considered an anathema by
Adorno, Horkheimer or Benjamin. The case of journalism, the object of Benjamin’s antipathies, is
illustrative. The development of modern news journalism, with its non-decorative and formulaic
discourse, was seen as the degradation of language which deprived it of faculties capable of giving
expression to personal experience. In this sense, news journalism was indicative of the fate public
language had to meet in the post-liberal society with its narrowing spaces for individual freedom.
As a result, Adorno, Benjamin and Marcuse turned from everyday communication to art as the
avenue through which freedom could speak. It was not the direct, practical language used in
discussion and debates that inspired the first-generation Frankfurt School,  but the indirect,
aesthetically distanciating language of art. With Habermas the centre of Critical Theory gravitates
from aesthetics towards general communication theory (cf. S Weber 1976).
Habermas’ communicative turn which became well-known in the 1980s, but which
was anticipated by the conceptual solutions applied in Strukturwandel,  can  be  seen  as  part  of  the
pragmatist turn witnessed in post-war philosophy, linguistics and social research. Habermas made
this move in order to address better the fundamental theoretical and methodological objective of the
Frankfurt  School,  which  was  the  attempt  at  developing  an  anti-positivist  kind  of  social  analysis.
More  closely,  this  called  for  a  type  of  inquiry  that  would  oppose  both  the  atomism  and  value-
scepticism  of  positivism.  Anti-atomism  explains,  on  one  hand,  why  the  role  of  philosophy  and
sociology  as  two paradigms of  holistic  inspection  has  been  given  special  attention  to  in  Frankfurt
methodology (in concept and theory formation). On the other, explicit normativity clarifies why
communication, aesthetic or practical, has been of prime importance for Critical Theorists. Critique
implies values and norms by which a given state of affairs is judged good or deficient. If values,
following positivism, are excluded from rational or scientific discourse, criticism becomes a matter
of personal opinion without any objective foundation. German Idealism, from Kant to Hegel, had
tried  to  circumvent  this  conclusion  by  stressing  the  primacy  of  practical  reason  (Kant)  and  the
dialectical nature of concept formation leaning on normative and systematic presuppositions
(Hegel); and the successive generations of the Frankfurt School have usually drawn on these
sources. It is the normative grounding of critical social theory by Habermas’ idea of communication
which interests me in the following.
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Frankfurt School a counter-factual or utopian model by which to gauge contemporary society.
Habermas  preserves  this  utopian  dimension,  but  he  transfers  it  from  the  high  altitude  of  cultural
masterpieces to ordinary surroundings. The basic intuition from which Habermas proceeds lies in
the idea that when discussing people relate to each others in a non-coercive and complementary
way which can be taken as the image of good society in miniature. That is, in speaking to other
people and in listening to them speaking to you one becomes a member of a community which, in
the  last  resort,  includes  all  mankind.  In  this  sense,  we  can  say  that  Habermas’  theory  of
communication is informed by the age-old idea of finding a language by which humanity could be
united. For Habermas this utopian hope is entertained by the possibilities inhering in such a use of
language that, on the basis of the truth-claims presupposed by any utterance, strives for a consensus.
The consensus may not be reached ever in any singular case, but it is the regulative idea of the way
leading  to  a  possible  consensus  which  is  at  issue.  Or,  we  may  never  realise  the  utopia  of  total
harmony, but it is the attempts at approaching it that matter. Maybe we could also say that, in
Habermas, communicative action makes possible the local realisation of the utopian existence
which otherwise evades us.
Mature Habermas has, especially in Theorie, constructed his ’mild utopianism’ on the
basis of develepments in the pragmatist philosophy of language (later Wittgenstein, Austin and
others) which he has combined with sociological theories having a communicative component
(Durkheim, Mead, Parsons). As we have seen, Habermas returned to issues of public sphere (and
civil society) towards the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s, mainly in Faktizität und Geltung
and papers associated with it. What is noteworthy, and illustrative of Habermas’ preferences, is that
despite the massive theoretical breadth of both Theorie and Faktizität he  has  not  given  us  a
comprehensive treatise of private and public life comparable to Strukturwandel – that is, he has not
updated in a systematic fashion his view on the role of public communication in contemporary
society. As this is a major deficiency in his theory, I will touch upon it in the last and evaluative part
of my paper.  Here I  try to spell  out a rough scheme of how later Habermas conceives of the way
interpersonal and mass communication (or mass media) are related in their relation to political
action in general and the political system in specific.
Speech communication is a life-world phenomenon or capacity because it presupposes
a universal human faculty. In other words, people are not separated into different categories on the
basis  of  their  ability  to  speak  –  to  be  a  human  being  in  the  full  sense  is  to  be  able  to  use  the
symbolic medium of language. There may be different dialects or registers of articulation, such as
revealing the educational status of the speaker, but nevertheless everybody has a direct access to
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institutionalised means of interaction. This means that language, for Habermas, fulfills
simultaneously several important functions: it imparts information about the outside and inside
worlds; while revealing ourselves to others and vice versa, it makes subjects intersubjective or
dependent on each other; it is democratic while within everybody’s compass; and it cannot be
totally controlled because it has its roots deep in the traditions and pre-understandings of the life-
world. In this sense, language defines man basically as a free, social and rational being: free,
because language springs from subterranean wells no one can control; social, because language is
inherently intersubjective; and rational, because the use of language is oriented on the basis of truth-
claims which makes it self-corrective. I take the social aspect into closer scrutiny.
Habermas’ turn away from the public sphere to communicative action, which marks
the basic difference between Strukturwandel and Theorie, was propelled by his new interpretation
of  Hegel.  In  the Strukturwandel of 1962 Habermas had proposed mainly a critical reading of
Hegel’s idea of public opinion as expressed in Philosophy of Right. Around 1965, a decisive change
in Habermas’ attitude occured. In a seminal piece of 1967, Habermas showed that before his
philosophy of mind assumed absolutist or monological pretensions, first in Phenomenology of Mind
and then culminating in Philosophy of Right, Hegel had developed an authencitally heterological
conception with three separate centres in which reflection or reason is mediated: language, work
and interaction (Habermas 1968). In other words, the young pre-Phenomenology Hegel had
conceived the multiplicity of reason not as a process leading inevitably to the synthesis of the
Absolute Mind, but as a structural whole with singular, yet mutually determining components.
Habermas’ theory of communicative action, which describes a certain kind of interaction with the
means of language to organise social life, was elaborated from this intuition of structural
intersubjectivity – or of the different media by which people organise their intersubjective relations.
More specifically, Habermas preserved Hegel’s idea of the social mediation of needs and identity
on the basis of language, work and interaction, but he abandoned mature Hegel’s ambitions at
logical completeness. This conception of language as social action was a new way of formulating
the political problem underlying Strukturwandel.
Habemas had made it clear from the very beginning, in the first paragraph of
Strukturwandel, that his interest in the public sphere was motivated by its central place in the
functioning of modern democracies, a fact that is reflected in the constitutional guarantees accorded
to it. The decline of the public realm, as diagnosed in Strukturwandel, was considered alarming
because it threatened the political legitimacy of democracy by stripping popular sovereignty, or
collective self-rule, of its substance. The experiences of the 1960s, with a new upsurge in political
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and cultural activism, had some influence on Habermas, one may presume, because he dropped the
Adorno-like pessimism of Strukturwandel, and started to develop a more optimistic political
estimate, from Legitimationsprobleme (1973) on. In Theorie (1981) the optimism was located
excplicitly in the new social movements. More recently, after Faktizität (1992), Habermas has
expressed similar hopes in connection with the European Union. In all these cases the optimism of
Habermas has grown from the constitutive link between language and politics as expressed in the
idea of communicative action.
I  hope  it  is  now  easier  to  see  how,  in  its  political  implications,  young  Habermas’
emphasis on the public sphere correlates with the conception of language and communication in
later Habermas. Following the Hegelian intuition, human needs are for Habermas always
interpreted through the filter of language in intercourse with other people, which means that
identities are linguistically constructed on the basis of cultural traditions and interpretative models.
One corollary of this is that public communication, the kind of opinions and expressions with which
the public realm is filled, assumes central political significance in democracy. Namely, if
democratic politics is about the course a society should take in response to what its people want to
be done in order to lead an optimally satisfying life, then the available linguistic resources are a
politically relevant matter. Or, the health or non-distortedness of public communication becomes a
basic political issue – and this in two respects, which specify the relation between the cultural and
political public spheres in Habermas.
The society needs a cultural public sphere which would assist people in monitoring
their basic assumptions and giving expression to their intimate yearnings. This is mainly the realm
of literature and other forms of imaginative rendering of human behaviour in fiction, both ’high’
and ’popular’, verbal and audiovisual. Via a non-distorted cultural public sphere people are
presented  with  a  plurality  of  languages  by  which  they  can  come to  know better  who they  are  and
what  they  want  to  be.  This  is  vital  for  the  political  public  sphere  to  operate  properly.  Ideally,  the
function of the political public sphere is to help the society in deciding on what amounts to public
good. To achive this, the political public realm should reflect people’s divergent preferences and
arouse discussion about their generalisability – that is, about which preferences are only group-
centred and which applicable to all. The political decisions are ultimately based on the formal
procedures of voting, but it is the co-operation of the cultural and political public spheres which
only gives sense and legitimacy to the act of voting. In terms of political theory, Habermas uses the
theory of communicative action to articulate a substantial conception of democracy in contrast to a
mere formal one. I will conclude this section by describing in some detail what kind of political
options the conception implies.
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Habermas’ change of social theory from the model inspired by Philosophy of Right, in
Strukturwandel, to that of synthesising hermeneutics and systems theory, in Theorie, is motivated
by the conviction that by the late 1960s, the modern society had reached such a level of complexity
and differentiation that the idea of undiminished popular sovereignty shared by radical democrats
and socialist utopianists alike had to be reformulated. There is no going back to a holistic view with
the corresponding collective subject because the modern society is irretrievably cut in two, the
system  of  economics  and  state  administration  plus  the  life-world  of  civil  society  and  everyday
interaction. This means that there are no direct ways of influencing the material reproduction of
society (the capitalist economy) and the implementation of popular will by conducting affairs of the
state (administration). As a consequence, the concepts of democratic will-formation and power have
to be given a new content. This leads Habermas, drawing on a distinction made by Arendt, to
separate communicative power from administrative one: the former shows itself in the free
exchange of ideas in the public, while the latter is restricted to the acts performed by administration
on  the  basis  of  political  decisions.  In  sum,  we  get  an  overall  picture  of  the  link  between
communicative action and democracy that looks like the following.
Democracy is about the self-rule of the people. Given the complexity of the modern
society, the popular sovereignty assumes two forms: one is concerned with the relations of the
citizens to the formal political system (and indirectly, via the passing of laws, to the economic
system)  through  elections,  and  the  other  with  the  processes  of  public  opinion  and  will-formation
within civil society. Democracy remains formal if only the first condition is fulfilled, and it
becomes substantial – or radical – if also the second one is met. Or, radical democracy has to do
with the prospects of communicative action, in its private and public domains. In this respect,
Habermas bases his political theory on two communicative premises or desiderata the level of
which he thinks the modern society has now achieved. The first is post-conventional rationality
which makes people both responsive to other’s opinions and self-critical, and the second is an
enlightened public sphere which, in its way, is responsive to people’s needs while preserving the
critical  spirit  of its  own. Radical democracy works if  and only if  the communicative action of the
civil society has genuine influence on the political system, and if the will-formation within the civil
society is grounded on the reciprocity of private and public levels – that is, if people’s sentiments or
need-articulations find their way to the public consciousness, and if the people reflect on their basic
assumptions with the help of discourses and representations in both the cultural and political public
spheres. Keeping this in mind, the following tripartite conception of public life as viewed by
Habermas emerges (cf. Habermas 1996).
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As a  Hegelian  of  sorts,  Habermas  is  impatient  with  seeing  only  one  side  of  a  thing,
and this drives him to relativise dichotomies too. The said applies also for his theory of public life
and politics. Habermas’ basic view is both liberal, starting from individual autonomy, and
republican, stressing collective virtues, but it is also compatible with more avant-gardist leanings,
foregrounding the decisive role of forward-looking minorities in defending democracy against
encroachments of its fundamental principles. I will say a few words more about each case.
Fundamentally, Habermas’ view on the relations between public life, mass media and
politics comes from the liberalist tradition; in this respect, there is no marked difference between the
earlier and later phases of his thought. Habermas has always stressed certain liberalist principles, if
not  all  (on  these,  cf.  Popper  1978).  Among  these  are  the  autonomy  of  the  individual,  the  prime
significance of morality in individual behaviour, and the central place of critical discussion with its
concomitant features such as readiness to learn from one’s mistakes. This Kantian side of Habermas
surfaced vigorously in Strukturwandel when he took up Kant’s idea of the public use of reason and
transformed it into a theory of the debating political sphere. Consequently, it will come as no
suprise that his revised model of the public sphere, advanced in Faktitizät, looks pretty much the
same as the one presented in mainstream US political-communication research (cf. Pye 1963). In
both the basic problem of political communication with which the modern society is faced consists
in managing a two-way process of communication flows between the professionalised mass media
and the non-professional everyday actors. Ideally, both should be sensitive to the other – the media
professionals to their receivers in order to give public voice to private grievances, and the audience
members to the media in order to submit their assumptions to rational questioning.
At the time of Stukturwandel Habermas (1963) made it quite explicit that what he
wanted to accomplish was to rehabilitate classical political philosophy with modern means, in
opposition to the instrumentalist and technocratic conception stemming from Hobbes, and also
diverging from Hannah Arendt’s (1958) Neo-Aristotelian idealisation of ancient times (this is, by
the way, one of the subthemes in Strukturwandel). In this sense we can say that through his career
he has sided with republicanism, but with important provisos (on the idea of the republic, cf. Heller
1985). As the modern society is bourgeois and complex, ie giving precedence to economy over
politics and restricting severely the possibilities of political interventions into society, the old
republican virtues have to be adapted to modern conditions. The inherent romantic anti-capitalism,
the idea of the irretrievable conflict between political virtues and economic interests as standards of
ethical life in the traditional republican frame of mind, has to be discarded. This has led Habermas
to make a distinction between two kinds of political action, influencing the political system through
voting and the civil society through political activism (cf. Benhabib 1992) – a duality that correlates
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with the two dimensions of democracy (formal and substantial) introduced earlier. What Habermas
preserves from the republican tradition is the idea of endless discussing and debating as the heart of
equalitarian relations between citizens – that is, as the core around which social solidarity is built
(cf. also Habermas 1995). In other words, the modern republicanism à la Habermas is committed to
communicative action as the paradigm of politically good life dedicated to the upholding of the
society.
Synthesising liberalism and republicanism would be enough if the complexity and
differentiation of the modern society could be stabilised. But they cannot, for two reasons at least.
First, the systemic forces of the economy and administration threaten the autononomy of the life-
world which makes the social whole inherently conflictual, and, second, modernity is still an
unfinished project that has not exhausted its resources. As a result, radical democracy has now and
then to fight its way through obstacles, which calls for persons, groups and social movements
determined enough to oppose the normal way of thinking and acting. This aspect makes, inevitably,
Habermas susceptible to a kind of avant-gardism. Literally, the avant-gardes in politics and arts
have been defined by their forward-looking vision of society and culture: they as a minority try to
anticipate in the present what the mass of people will do in the future (on the concept of the avant-
garde,  cf.  Egbert  1967).  Even  if  avant-gardism  in  the  strong  sense,  with  the  demise  of  the
communist  movement  and  the  modernist  art,  has  lost  much  of  its  appeal,  it  is,  minimally  in  a
weaker sense, manifest in the way Habermas emphasises the role of public intellectuals and
knowledgeable activists in initiating processes of opinion-formation in the civil society. Still, one
could say that Habermas is advocating also the stronger case. When dissident groups and social
movements defending their bodies and souls against incursions into the life-world that violate their
idea of good life are also fighting for the possible future of the whole society,  ie,  in the case their
values turn out to be generalisable, they do represent a sort of moral avant-garde. For it is the moral
sensitivity and civil courage of exceptional individuals on which, in the Habermasian political
universe, collective self-rule is ultimately based.
Assessing Habermas’ Contribution
I started from a paradox: those who are interested in Habermas’ theory of the public sphere do not
normally pay attention to the overall architecture of his work, and those more at home in Habermas’
philosophical-sociological developments hardly ever focus on the function of public communication
in his social thinking. The lacking mediation between the two approaches encouraged me to
propose a line of reasoning that could negotiate between, on one hand, communication and media
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theory, and, on the other, political and social theory. Habermas’ own career, the shift of emphasis
from the 1960s to the 1980s, or the difference between ’young’ and ’mature’ Habermas, seemed to
make the mediating approach all the more urgent while it highlights graphically how Habermas’
general interests are reflected in the way he understands the place of the public realm and mass
media  in  modern  constitutional  democracies.  In  other  words,  his  theory  forms  a  whole  whose
change changes the meaning of its elements, such as the concept of communication and media.
After the analytical part, I will conclude my presentation with an evaluative one, by dealing with
both the advantages and limitations of Habermas’ position.
That Strukturwandel has become a classic both in media studies and in political
studies concerned with civil society speaks for itself. We can say that, so far, it has stood the test of
time. This has not been self-evident while, during the years of the student movement, there were
attempts at replacing Habermas’ theory with a more radical one. The most ambitious of these ’anti-
Habermases’, which was at its time highly celebrated, was the work on the proletarian public sphere
by Negt and Kluge (1972); howewer, it no longer inspires contemporary debates on and
reformulations of the subject. Probably this is due to the greater amount of political realism in
Habermas compared with his more radical Marxist colleagues in the late sixties and early seventies.
Anyway, to assess the contuing relevance of Habermas’ contribution one has to measure it against
more recent, but differently thematised endeavours to diagnose the state of public life in the present-
day society. I take up two variants of postmodernist social and cultural thinking – Deleuzeanism
and Cultural Studies – for the purpose of comparison.
Keeping in mind the disastrous developments of the Second European ’Thirty Years’
War’ (1914–1945), some members of the first generation of the Frankfurt School had harboured the
idea that the bourgeois society was a self-annihilating project. Even in the young Habermas of
Strukturwandel one can find traces of this disillusionement. It is, however, after the 1960s that the
idea of the post-bourgeois or post-modern society, usually associated with the French philosophy of
Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze and others, has gained wide currency. More recently, the work of Gilles
Deleuze  has  given  rise  to  a  new kind  of  social  theorisation.  As  an  example  I  comment  briefly  on
Michael Hardt’s and Antonio Negri’s (2000; cf. also Hardt 1995) elaboration on Deleuze’s (1990)
idea of the society of control and its significance for reconceptualising the role of the public sphere.
The main thesis Hardt and Negri advance may be put in Hegelian terms. Hegel’s
(1973) social philosophy of modernity in Philosophy of Right is institutional – ie, he is interested in
the kind of social structure that could guarantee the achievements of the bourgeois society, freedom
and rationality. To this effect he makes the distinction between three basic institutions or
institutional levels with their of own functions in educating men to recognise others as human
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beings (family), as necessary partners in promoting one’s self-interest (civil society), and as co-
fellows in integral ethical life (state). In the Hegelian interpretation, then, the evolution of
modernity equates the evolution of these institutions and their interrelations. Accordingly,
Habermas’ Strukturwandel adds to the Hegelian scheme the fourth institution of the public sphere,
and tries to demonstrate by its fate how the evolution of the bourgeois society is regressive, turning
the clocks back to the time of the Middle Ages (Habermas’ thesis of refeodalisation). In a sense,
Hardt and Negri accept Habermas’ conclusion but not his premise that the rising bourgeois society
should be considered as a model of freedom and rationality. This is so because the Hegelian-
insitutional theorisation no longer holds in the postmodern or postcivil society.
For Hardt and Negri, the new kind of society that emerges after modernity is linked to
the  crisis  of  institutions,  especially  of  civil  society.  More  specifically,  the  process  involves  the
blurring of boundaries, so that the distinction between state and civil society loses all meaning. In
other words, Hardt and Negri stick to the interpretative tradition, leading from Marx to Weber to the
first-generation of the Frankfurt School and Foucault, according to which modernity is based on one
underlying logic – be it that of capital accumulation, goal-oriented and instrumental rationality,
disciplining or (with Deleuze) control. With the withering of civil society deprived of its autonomy
radical social theory and activism must then relocate their focal point which, to Hardt and Negri,
can be found in the new forms of labour under capitalism’s latest phase. Or, what Hardt and Negri
propose in the guise of Foucauldian-Deleuzean biopolitics is a kind of postmodern Marxism
stressing the informational or communicative nature of the new forms of labour. With these the
communicative potential of the postmodern society is not to be found in a revised public sphere, but
in the the new cooperative organisation of work relations – something which Marx anticipated with
his idea of the intellectualisation of labour.
Hardt’s and Negri’s bleak depiction of the disapperance of civil society runs against
the  celebration  of  civil  society  and  public  sphere  in  recent  social  and  media  theory.  It  is  not,
however,  clear  that  their  critique  of  the  Hegelian  theory  of  civil  society  amounts  to  a
counteragument against and replacement of Habermas – or, that it should give us sufficient reason
for abandoning the modern frame of reference. Here Habermas’ original idea of the public sphere,
with the later parallel elaborations on the theory of the life-world, seem to offer the basis for a sort
of immunity against Hardt and Negri. Namely, for Habermas the public sphere and civil society are
not institutional in the sense the economy and state administration are – this was the reason why the
young Habermas completed the Hegelian three-level model, and why the mature one sticks to the
separatness of the system and the life-world. One of the fundamental characteristics of public
sphere and civil society, for Habermas, is just their inherent working against one-dimensionality or
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any  attemps  at  their  total  subsumption.  This  is  the  basis  of  his  optimism:  the  public  sphere,  life-
world  and  civil  society,  with  their  of  logic  of  communicative  action,  will  always  resist  both  the
accumulation of capital and the interventions of state administration which strive for enlarging the
domain of discipline and control in society.
With Cultural Studies the challenge to Habermas changes place from that posed by
Deleuzeanism, even if the post-bourgeois or post-modern premise still holds. Like Habermas
Cultural Studies locates the resistance in society within the life-world in its opposition to the
system, but unlike Habermas it conceptualises the difference between the two as an unbridgeable
divide. The case of John Fiske, one of the best-known representatives of Anglo-American Cultural
Studies, may illustrate my point. I sketch briefly the evolution of his conception of popular culture
in order to confront it with Habermas.
In  the  tradition  of  Raymond  Williams  and  Richard  Hoggart,  Fiske  started  as  a
defender of working-class culture, but unlike these he identified television as the main locus of what
can be called, even if Fiske does not do so himself, the ’proletarian’ public sphere. The early Fiske
(see Fiske & Hartley 1978) sees television, with its oral emphasis, as the main weapon against the
class-rule of the bourgeoisie established by the means of literary culture. Accordingly, television
gives legitimate expression to the working-class with ist collective and participatory way of life,
and against the bourgeois individualism constructed on the pillars of literate modes of thought.
Even if there is in television, in sports programmes for instance, a battle between middle- and
working-class regimes of signification, which makes television contradictory, Fiske sides with
popular resources of the medium. It is noteworthy that Fiske, in a McLuhanesque fashion, bases his
argument mainly on the oral nature of television – the difference between the two paradigms of
language-use, writing and speaking, being associated with negative values in the former case and
with positive values in the latter one. This is a media-specific way of stating how the post-bourgeois
society actually emerges.
Next Fiske’s paradigm of popular culture was transferred from the working-class
context to a more classless idea of popular culture (see Fiske 1987). Now television is no longer
popular because of its oral allure, but because of its semiotic openness making different
interpretations possible. Actually, Fiske invests popular television with those qualities modernist
asthetic theory had preserved for rare pieces of 20th century art and literature: textual open-
endedness; polysemy or ambiguity of meaning; the active response required from the reader or
viewer; and the resistance to the powers that be provided by the critical tenor involved. This move
seems to transform mainstream television into ’high culture for the ordinary man’ – or, it does
presuppose a high degree of self-reflexivity and intellectuality in the television-viewers. To make
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things complicated, Fiske (1992a) has at the same time drawn on a strong dualist vocabulary
privileging tabloid journalism over quality and alternatives ones. The idea is that popular journalism
is critical because it turns the society upside down: it ridicules the elite’s way of comprehending the
world and is in this way authentically expressive of popular sentiments and wisdom. Ultimately,
Fiske is defending the people which is no longer defined in class-terms, but in opposition to ’the
power-bloc’.
The challenge Fiske’s Cultural Studies poses to the kind of Frankfurt School
represented by Habermas can be cut down to three major issues: the relation between the life-world
and the system; the rationality of the public sphere;  and the reflexivity of everyday actors.  I  think
Habermas’ alternative is more convincing, both intuitively and argumentatively, on all counts. First,
Fiske, like most of Cultural Studies, lacks a social theory that could explain the working of modern
societies in more elaborate terms than just by abstract dichotomies. In Fiske the modern society is
mainly reduced either to a class-antagonism (middle-class against working-class) or a dichotomy
reeking of populism (the people against the power-bloc). What is more, there is no attempt at
according to the other side of the barricade any positivity. In this sense, Fiske’s is a distant echo of
ouvriérisme or the doctrines of the proletarian culture. Instead, Habermas social theory, from
Strukturwandel to Theorie and Faktizität, while admitting that the perspective of ’the people’ (life-
world)  must  be  given  a  certain  priority  in  its  relation  to  the  ’power-bloc’  (system),  is  able  to
describe in detail how the operation of the society calls for coordinating the actions of the people
and the power-bloc, not only trying to eliminate the latter one.
Second, in terms of public life, this means that the bourgeois public sphere with its
corresponding ideals of rationality based on argumentation, criticism and self-critique are found
useless by Fiske. They are only weapons of coercion and intimidation, not means of rational
expression of opinions and coordination of interactions. The irony resides in the fact that Fiske’s
conception of popular culture, consciously or unconsciously, draws on modernism, and so he,
indirectly at least, admits that high culture can have salutary effects. However, it is more relevant to
point out that, because of the lack of mediation between the people and the power-bloc, Fiske’s
theory of democracy is purely cultural or semiotic, excluding parliamentary politics. In other words,
Fiske is not interested in whether the resistance put up in the field of the public sphere, civil society
or the mass media actually leads to changes in formal politics. This makes Fiske’s conception of
resistance mainly symbolical – semiotic ’guerilla war’ has existential significance to those involved
(it is identity-work of sorts), but not any connection to the outer-world. In this sense Fiske’s concept
of popular culture, as a political theory of the media, is introvert or defensive – the main function of
the popular public sphere is to safeguard the seclusion of the people from contamination by the
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power-bloc, not to make its voice heard in the upper echelons of society. While Habermas reserves
room for both functions life-world actors perform – that of inner cohesion and influencing the rest
of society – there are systematic reasons at least for privileging his theory.
Every political media theory proclaiming popular sovereignty or the power of the
people as its raison d’être must account for the basic premise of this, namely, the ability of all men,
ordinary or extraordinary, to exercise judgement. Consequently, one of the main tenets, if not the
main one, of Cultural Studies in general and Fiske in particular is the idea of the active audience.
Television-viewers or radio-listeners are not mindless dupes but highly reflexive persons prone to
judicious readings of the media fare. Among the ordinary media audience it is, however, the fans
who demonstrate this capability best (cf. Fiske 1992b). As the avant-garde of the people, fans not
only bend the media output to correspond with their own interests, but they also produce, on the
basis of what the culture industry has to offer, their own communities or sub- and counter-cultures.
For Fiske the function of the fan community, as we have seen, is not to change society but to defend
a way of life. Yet, at this point the more important issue is concerned with the basis of audience
activeness,  whether  of  the  normal  or  the  fan  type.  Fiske,  like  Cultural  Studies  in  general,  fails  to
adduce any substantial theoretical support for the thesis of elaborate reflexivity prevailing in
everyday media reception. The evidence presented consists mainly of general theoretical
assumptions and, in most cases, empirical case studies, but a convincing connection between them
is missing. It is just here, I argue, that Habermas’ theory of communicative action comes to help.
Namely, Habermas’ theory, following the Enlightenment tradition, not only gives theoretical
support for the existence of common sense, but it also explains why the development of modernity,
in the conditions of post-conventionality, increases the amount of reflexivity. The former part of the
theory specifies the foundations of audience activeness, while the latter one expounds why the
phenomenon becomes more prevalent as we approach the present or the late modern society. Put in
other words, Habermas’ theory explains more than that of Fiske, and this makes it more heuristic.
Even if the Habermasian kind of Critical Theory can compete successfully with some
contemporary alternatives like Deleuzeanism and Cultural Studies, or with some of their aspects at
least, it is far from faultless. Actually, during his career Habermas has repeatedly aroused scathing
criticism from both the academic right and left. The critiques have centred aroung recurring themes,
like those of, especially,  idealism, formalism, affirmativeness and gender-blidness. Habermas’
idealism (’Hegelianism’) is usually associated with the communicative view on society, which
according to the critics renders him oblivious of more material factors; his formalism
(’Kantianism’), with discourse ethics and the theory of democracy constructed on its bases, which
give political commitments a procedural flavour only; his affirmativeness (’social democracy’),
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with  the  consensus  theory  of  truth  and  its  application  to  the  resolution  of  social  conflicts,  which
amounts to accepting capitalism not only as a historical necessity but also as the limit to social
experimentation; and his gender-blindness (’patriarchalism’), with universalising from the
experience of privileged 18th-and-19th-century white bourgeois males to all human beings, which
deprives  his  theory  of  its  most  ambitious  aspect,  universality,  and  turns  it  into  an  expression  of
European male prejudice. Admitting that these items of criticism, for any observer sympathetic to
the main tenor of Habermas’ project, are worthy of careful scrutiny, they are not immediately
relevant in the present context. Instead, I will take up three lines of counterarguments against
Habermas which concentrate more directly on the media and communication aspects of his theory.
They are concerned with the specificity of mass communication, the diffentiation of the media
system, and the consequences of the increasing growth of the channels of public communication.
After Strukturwandel, when he began to elaborate on the foundations of the theory of
communicative action, Habermas made it quite clear that communication was for him about speech
communication or speaking. This intuition, influentially developed in the post-war pragmatist
philosophy of language and significantly anticipated in the philosophy of spirit by the young Hegel,
led him to the idea that, if speaking could be seen as a form of social action, the edifice of social
theory could be constructed on communication. This left in the air the problem, of crucial
importance to media scholars, of how interpersonal communication between two speakers is related
to mass communication between an unspecified amount of persons. In mass communication theory
this is known as the problem of limiting the lower level of its object-domain, ie, that level below
which we no longer have to do with mass but interpresonal phenomena. It is, then, no wonder that
Habermas’ theory of the public sphere has been considered out-of-date because it presupposes such
conditions of public speaking, namely a physical place like the agora in ancient Greece, that no
longer apply (see Thompson 1995). The point is relevant, which can be identified by the fact that
more recently – in Faktizität –  Habermas has tried to detach his concept of public sphere from
those aspects that make it the continuation of dialogues in limited locales like salons or cafés. If this
line of arguing is correct, the major fault of Habermas’ theory of communicative action as a social
theory  and  – mutatis mutandis – a media theory lies in the deduction from dyadic relations to
relations involving practically an infinite number of actors (cf. also Lanigan 1979).
The Strukturwandel includes a media theory, whatever its connection to conceptions
of speech communication. To be more specific, Habermas grounds his concept of public sphere on
the existence of two major forms of media at the time of the rise of the bourgeoisie: the newspaper
(political public sphere), and the novel (cultural public sphere). As Habermas is more interested in
the former, it is not inadequate to claim that the political newspaper and the critical magazine
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approximate his ideal type of media making rational formation of beliefs possible. Given the
plethora of media forms which the 20th century gave rise to, commentators have voiced doubts
about the applicability of Habermas’ ideals to a later phase of the modern media system. In this
culture-industry phase, and as a consequence of the increasing differentiation one could say, it is not
only that the media are dictated by commercial imperatives, which Strukturwandel takes into
consideration, but they also form the junction of several independent logics which vary from a
medium to another (cf. Miège 1989). This complicates transferring Habermas’ ideal type from print
media to audiovisual media, mainly television – and not only to the commercial but also to the
public-service one. Again, one can detect a glaring inconsistency in Habermas. This can be inferred
from the fact that, while he still sticks to the centrality of public sphere in democracy, he openly
admits that he has nothing to say about contemporary media politics – ie, about how to reform the
media system in order to make it correspond more adequately with the requirements of his political
theory  (see  Habermas  2001).  The  conclusion  seems  to  point  out  another  major  problem  in
Habermas, the questionable ideality of the political newspaper in the age of television (although the
age of the Internet may reopen the case).
Even if the differences between the media, considered as vehicles of political will- and
cultural  self-formation,  could  be  dismissed  as  irrelevant,  it  is  their  number  that  works  against  the
idea of the public realm. Namely, in order to work adequately the public sphere should be
accessible to all, not only in principle but in reality – otherwise we have at hand only partial or
illusory public spheres (cf. Ludes 1993). The phenomenon in itself is not new. Since the late 18th
century, with the so-called second printing revolution, and the turn of the 20th century, with the so-
called first audiovisual revolution (for a history of the media clarifying these periodizations, see
Barbier & Bertho Lavenir 2000), the amount of total media output has continually increased.
Nobody has ever been able to read all the newspapers and books nor to see all the films and
television programmes – not to speak of listening to all records or tuning in to all the available radio
stations.  What is  more,  the most popular books,  films or television shows do not ever reach but a
minority of the population (barring wholly exceptional social circumstances). Even if this structural
fact can be dated back to the beginning of the modern media system during the latter part of the
18th century, it has been aggravated by what could be called the ’second’ structural transformation
of the public sphere. The first transformation was concerned with the emergence of the culture
industry, when the commercialisation of the media took on qualitatively new dimensions, while the
second one is about the extreme pluralisation of both the media and their output – that is to say,
about their both extensive and intensive growth. In a way Habermas has noticed the relevance of
this development, for he has – in Faktizität – begun to speak, as the basis of the public sphere, not
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only of issue- or media-specific debates but also of ’anonimous’ communications flows. While this
may save Habermas from some awkward concequences as far as his original theory of the public
sphere is concerned, and bring it closer to post-structuralist ideas of textuality, it is not evident that
the democratic premise of his theory, namely that the public sphere taken as a totality should
authentically reflect what goes on in the life-world, still holds after these revisions. For maybe the
media system has become over-complex in the sense that, given the immensity of its manifestations,
nobody can with any certainty say what it includes. If this is so we, or any finite subject in the sense
of Habermas’ post-metaphysical philosophy, can never know what the people wants politically save
through the formal procedures of voting. Such an upshot would, however, threaten to collapse the
basic idea of substantial democracy so pressing to Habermas.
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